Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. arenas. This research paper attempts to make some sense of the ongoing debate over the appropriate command and control structures for space operations and information operations within a joint command, that is, at the joint operational level and below. I hope the reader finds it informative and useful in their own study of the doctrine, concepts, and vocabulary that accompany these discussions. tasked with developing command and control (C2) structures for space and information operation (IO) capabilities within a joint force. The first product is a decision matrix based upon two ideas essential to command and control. The first idea is that knowing the level of desired effect, that is, a strategic, operational, or tactical effect produced by space or IO functions is critical to the C2 structure. The second idea is that the JFC must determine which is more important, the integration of functional capabilities into a single mission oriented team or the preservation of functional identities due to high demand/low density resources, the need to preserve critical functional expertise, or other related reasons which drive functional organizations.
With the unsettled nature of space and IO C2 firmly established, this research focuses on providing a Joint Force Commander (JFC) an initial decision tree to use when establishing C2 structures for space and IO within a joint force. This paper also proposes core space and IO C2 structures at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of conflict that can be adapted to the situation encountered by a joint force. The decision tree and core C2 structures are developed using current and proposed doctrine as a guideline and information collected while conducting a case study on OEF space and IO C2 structures.
The next section of Chapter 1 discusses the methodology for using the doctrine and OEF data to develop the decision tree and core C2 structures.
Methodology
I conducted research for this paper in three phases. First, I reviewed and summarized the information found in joint and service publications regarding space and IO C2 structures. In addition, within phase 1, I augmented the doctrinal information with organizational theory developed outside the military. Third, I analyzed the space and IO C2 doctrine in light of the OEF data and used the results to define two products. The first product is a decision tree to assist a JFC establishing space and IO C2 structures within a joint force. The second product is a core space and IO C2 structure to be implemented at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of conflict. The core C2 structure can be modified to suit a JFC's needs.
My analysis of the doctrine and organizational theory focused on identifying frequently occurring, important concepts found in the doctrine. Important concepts are broadly defined as those concepts discussed in detail, perhaps even noted as essential C2
concepts by the source document or publication. My analysis of OEF data included examining when doctrine was followed; when alternatives to doctrine were introduced;
and, in the opinion of interview subjects, what relationship, if any, existed between the use of doctrine or new ideas and OEF space and IO C2 structure efficiency. The resulting decision tree for determining the space and IO C2 structure consists of a series of questions for a JFC to ask himself to help guide the development of the C2 structure for a given mission.
A brief examination of the decision tree shows that it considers only two very simple variables. The first is the level of effect desired by the use of a space or IO function. The second is the balance struck between placing greater emphasis on the functional needs of a space or IO capability and the integrated team needs of a mission using several effectsproducing functions. After running through the decision tree with several different scenarios, I believe a core set of C2 structures can handle or be adapted to the results.
The examination of the decision tree results completed the final step in my analysis of the doctrine and OEF data.
Before going on it's important to note the author recognizes a formal process exists for accomplishing doctrinal change, a process that includes several steps and the heavy involvement of field experts in drafting proposed changes to doctrine. I hope that this paper provides some useful ideas for consideration during a period of anticipated change and growth in space and IO doctrine.
In the rest of this paper, Chapter 2 summarizes the doctrine matrices found in Appendix A, Chapter 3 summarizes the OEF case study, and Chapter 4 provides the analysis resulting in the decision tree and core C2 structures. A summary of conclusions and recommendations is presented in Chapter 5. 
Joint and Service Doctrine & Organizational Theory
I reviewed doctrine and organizational theory on C2 with the intent of identifying C2 principles considered common among the services in the Department of Defense (DoD) and with the field of organizational study outside the DoD. These common principles support the development of the decision tree to be used by a JFC establishing space and IO C2 structures. This chapter discusses the specific sources I reviewed and the matrices I used to document the review. Next, this chapter summarizes concepts I found to be significant to C2 structures. Finally, this chapter provides a link between doctrine and the decision matrix proposed in my analysis in Chapter 4.
I reviewed joint and service space and IO doctrine with a focus on sections within these publications related to C2 structures. I also reviewed Joint Publication (JP) 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces. Chapter III of JP 0-2 describes joint command and control concepts and theory that are applicable across the functional entities a commander must manage. The third idea emphasized across service doctrine is the concept of centralized control with decentralized execution. Related to the idea of centralized control is the concept of unity of command, which strives to achieve unity of effort. In one form or another, centralized control/decentralized execution, unity of command, and unity of effort are described in AFDD 2-5, JP 3-13, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-0, Marine Corps Operations, MCWP 3-40.4, AFDD 2-2 and JP 0-2.
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The fourth idea occurring frequently in doctrine is the concept of ensuring the person or unit assigned C2 responsibility has or will have access to the resources necessary to perform the C2 function. In this paper, I define resources as the people, training, and systems necessary to perform the C2 function. MCDP 1-0, AFDD 2-2, and JP 0-2 all discuss the importance of having the appropriate resources to perform C2.
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These four ideas, level of effect of an employed capability, depth of functional capability integration, centralized command and decentralized execution, and ability to perform assigned C2 functions, form the basis of the decision tree discussed in this paper.
Each concept is phrased as a question and in Chapter 4, the questions are developed into a decision tree. The SIOE, an integrated team of space and IO experts from USSPACECOM, is the most significant augmentation of the CENTCOM space and IO staff. I discuss the SIOE impacts on CENTCOM during the operational portion of this chapter. The JIOC, another element of USSPACECOM, is another entity I discuss further during the review of operational C2 structures.
The SIOE is an alternative structure to that proposed in doctrine for a joint force.
The Unified Command Plan tasks USSPACECOM with managing computer network attack and defense activities, collectively known as computer network operations (CNO), one of the tasks included in IO. In addition, for OEF, the SECDEF tasked USSPACECOM with the role of functioning as the supporting command for all IO support.
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The most noteworthy point to make about the strategic space and IO structures for OEF is the significance of integrating space and IO within SIOE. This was the first opportunity in a crisis situation for USSPACECOM to integrate the space support in it has always provided with its growing level of IO support. Every interview I conducted with individuals working directly with the SIOE unit at CENTCOM HQ noted that the SIOE space and IO members from the various supporting units functioned extremely well as a team. However, the verdict was split on the value added of integrating space and IO.
The resident staff appreciated the additional labor regardless of what the individual showed up at HQ to do. One subject even noted that the augmentee support worked so well they began to carry the CENTCOM positions to the numerous meetings the resident CENTCOM staff could not always cover. Representatives (TSR's). These NRO personnel provide assistance to the command in planning for the use of NRO systems. NRO LNOs and TSRs also provide a link to current NRO products and services including how to get into the collection process for new requirements.
Regarding the operational C2 structures, the SIOE is again worth noting. SIOE carried strategic significance because of the commitment and involvement in it of strategic leaders at the CINC level and above. Here in the objective level of conflict, the SIOE concept is significant because it introduces brand new structures to the space and IO communities on the operational CENTCOM joint staff. In addition, the assignment of a flag officer to lead the SIOE brought space, and particularly IO, concerns into important meetings. A flag officer was also able to support the members of the SIOE, representing their positions in forums where that support is needed. After collecting data on doctrine and OEF, I began to realize these questions are too narrow in their structure. The reader might view answers as applicable to all or at least the majority of scenarios a JTF may encounter. This should not be the case with information and space operations. The answer to one of these C2 structure questions is dependent upon the context of a scenario confronting a joint force.
Based upon my research, I propose a simple set of questions to guide a JFC setting up a C2 structure for space and IO. I base these questions upon my review of doctrine and the experiences relayed to me during interviews with individuals supporting OEF.
At this point it starts to become apparent I may be recommending that the space and IO C2 structure should be different for every scenario a JFC encounters. This statement is only partially correct. A different structure for every situation may be useful when the only variables considered are the variables discussed in this research. I do not believe constant change is appropriate when considering variables such as the funding, training needs, or losses in efficiencies due to continual changes in space and IO C2 structures.
Rather, I propose the establishment of a flexible C2 structure that contains a core set of elements that grow or shrink as dictated by the situation.
Revisiting the purpose of the research, my intent is to provide questions that help a JFC review important variables when considering a space and IO C2 structure. The answers to these questions help determine how a proposed existing core C2 structure within the combatant command can be adapted to serve the needs of the joint force. The development of these questions and the resulting core C2 structure is covered in the following sections. In the world of a JFC, I propose the question on effect be answered in one of three ways. The JFC desired level of effect will be tactical, operational, strategic or a combination of all three. Each of these levels of war is managed at a different level within the joint force. The JFC's desired level of effect for space and IO should guide him in determining at what level the space and IO C2 will need to be within the joint force. Individuals authorized to perform strategic duties should manage strategic effects.
Questions to Consider When Establishing Space and IO C2 Structures
The same point applies as we work our way on down to the tactical activities.
The second question a JFC should ask is:
2) Which is more critical to my mission, strong functional units or tightly integrated total effect oriented units? specialists, I cannot afford to assign this low density/high demand asset to a single home.
I will choose to leave the security team assigned to myself and allocate them when necessary. Asking question 2c) could result in a third scenario. If the job cannot be done properly without assigning the security team to work with the carpenters full time, then the teams must be integrated. But if the tasks the security team performs are relatively independent of the other laborers, then the security team will be better off staying functionally aligned as their own unit, moving from house to house to complete work.
With three answers for question 1) and two answers for question 2) (functional or mission integration) six possible C2 constructs can be identified. Figure 1 shows the decision tree resulting in these options. 
Figure 1 -C2 Decision Tree
In essence, using the decision tree results in a recommendation for a functional or mission oriented C2 structure at each of the three levels of management associated with a desired effect. For example, a JFC may desire an operational effect using IO for a task that is primarily IO in nature, lacking the need for other systems that could produce an effect such as aircraft or ships. The CINC could choose to function as the operational leader but would probably require a strong coordinating unit at the operational level such as the IO cell already contained in Doctrine. Other leaders at the operational level include the component commanders so he could choose to designate an IO component commander for this task and allocate support to him from among the existing component and service commands.
Another scenario is one where tactical units need tactical space effects such as navigation, weather or warning data being used to help plan a mission involving several different aircraft. In this scenario, the tactical effect, which is part of a larger integrated tactical mission, dictates the JFC delegate space C2 to the tactical level under the control of the commander leading the tactical mission. The amount of tactical control given to the tactical commander would be the maximum amount feasible, given the other taskings on the space assets from other commanders.
In addition to the two questions that form the basis of the decision tree, two other questions require answers to ensure adherence to other two principles found in doctrine and discussed in Chapter 2.
1) Does the C2 structure adhere to the principle of Unity of Command but allow for centralized control and decentralized execution?
2) Do the units assigned C2 roles have the resources (people, tools, training) or access to the resources to perform the C2 function for the assigned mission?
Centralized control and decentralized execution is one of the summary ideas I found throughout service publications (See Chapter 2). Army, Air Force and Marine publications all contained discussions on the importance of centralized control and decentralized execution.
Having the resources to perform the C2 is a point made frequently in Air Force doctrine. AFDD 2-2, Space Operation, points out that, at least for space, "the Air Force has the overwhelming majority of ... C2 experience, making it especially qualified to plan for offensive and defensive space activities." 2 A theater-wide perspective is inherent in the conduct of Air Force missions.
Core C2 Structures for a Joint Force
The C2 decision tree is intended for use throughout the life cycle of a joint force but with emphasis during the initial formation of the C2 structures. My recommendation for its use is not intended to suggest that large swings in organizational structures should frequently occur, creating unreasonable costs associated with the stand up and stand down of units.
However, the reality is that the direct or enabling effects produced by IO and space operations will be desired at all levels of conflict and often simultaneously at all levels of conflict. 3 The global nature of space forces, and the ability of IO to produce effects against sensitive targets such as the civilian population and leadership of the opponent, makes space and IO multi-level effects-producing capabilities.
I propose that rather than stipulate a set C2 structure for space and IO, a core set of C2 capabilities be established at all three levels of command, strategic, operational, and tactical. This small core set of capabilities would be the basis of an adaptable C2 structure that emphasizes C2 at the strategic level for one mission but at the tactical level for another. In addition, the core capabilities could be integrated with other effectsproducing structures such as a service or functional component within a joint force or left to stand alone when the decision tree leads you down a path that recognizes the need for a strong space or IO functional presence in the command.
The core C2 capabilities & concepts I propose are as follows: 
Discussion of Integration of Space and IO
I have chosen not to address the subject of integrating space and IO capabilities.
The matrices and core C2 structures I propose can be used for space and IO independently or with these functions integrated. As I noted in Chapter 3 while discussing OEF, the verdict was really out on whether or not the anticipated synergy would be there from integrating space and IO. In addition, the data I had on it from the interviews and web search I conducted was very sketchy. Integration of these two functions would be a potential area for future study.
Notes
Chapter 5
Recommendations & Summary
Recommendations
I recommend a decision tree like the one I developed in Chapter 4 be considered as a starting point to help categorize the critical variables in play when establishing a C2 structure for space and IO capabilities.
I also recommend that the DoD put a core set of C2 structures in place that focuses implementation within the services and coordination at the operational and strategic level where the JFC makes C2 decisions. Senior IO and space elements should be established within joint staffs of any size with the IO cell and space assets such as space support teams reporting to the senior staff officer rather than directly to the J3. The joint staff space and IO teams, headed up by and O-6 or O-7 within the J3 Operations directorate, should be prepared to realign as component commands should the JFC determine, with the assistance of the decision tree, that this is an appropriate action.
Summary
My research included the summarization of doctrine related to C2 structures for space and IO forces. I then examined essential aspects of this doctrine in light of a case study on space and IO C2 structures established at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels within CENTCOM for use in Operation Enduring Freedom. My analysis of the doctrine in light of OEF enabled me to develop a decision tree for use as a guide for JFCs or staffs tasked with establishing space and IO C2 structures within a joint force. Finally, I recommended some core space and IO C2 structures at the three levels of command which emphasize the idea of integrating space and IO into other effect-producing capabilities rather than segregating the functions into their own components. In recognition of the potential growth in the use of space and information operations capabilities independent of other military functions, I have also proposed we incorporate the ability to grow the space and IO cells or staffs into separate components at the operational and strategic level when the JFC feels this is the best course of action. 
